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A Public Privilege 
If a rule is only as good as its exceptions, and a reporter is only as good as 
her sources, then according to a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion,1 
Pennsylvania’s reporter’s privilege is the best of privileges and the worst of 
privileges. In that opinion, the court failed to carve a crime-fraud exception2 
out of Pennsylvania’s reporter’s privilege—or its “Shield Law”—despite having 
previously read a similar exception into every other evidentiary privilege.3 
Ironically, this alleged act of judicial “passivism” transformed the Shield Law 
into both a shield and a sword and mischaracterized the purposes served by all 
evidentiary privileges. 
According to the court, the Shield Law is exceptional, and thus 
exceptionless, because it is directed toward protecting the free flow of 
information to society for the public good, while the attorney-client privilege is 
intended for the private benefit of the client. In its reasoning, however, the 
court misunderstood both the attorney-client and reporter’s privileges. This 
essay argues that, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Jaffee v. Redmond,4 
all evidentiary privileges must serve two masters, private interests and public 
ends, and, contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s logic, crime-fraud 
exceptions do not undercut but bolster those public ends. 
 
1.  Nadler v. Warner Co., 184 A. 3 (Pa. 1936). 
2.  Under Pennsylvania’s crime-fraud exception to its attorney-client privilege, “When the 
advice of counsel is sought in aid of the commission of crime or fraud, the communications 
are not ‘confidential’ within the meaning of the statute, and may be elicited from the client 
or the attorney on the witness stand.” Id. 
3.  Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 956 A.2d 937, 945 (Pa. 2008). 
4.  518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996). 
a public privilege 
167 
 
lackawanna county blues:  the castellani  opinion 
In Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., a Pennsylvania court empanelled a 
grand jury to investigate allegations of wrongdoing at the Lackawanna County 
Prison.5 Citing “an unnamed source close to the investigation,” Jennifer Henn 
authored front-page stories for the Scranton Tribune and The Scranton Times, 
which proclaimed that former Lackawanna County Majority Democratic 
Commissioners Randall Castellani and Joseph Corcoran were “stonewalling” 
the grand jury.6 This was news to the public and Supervising Judge Isaac S. 
Garb, who found that the stories were completely at variance with grand jury 
transcripts and that “[o]bviously, the source of the reporter’s information was 
someone not privy to the Grand Jury proceedings.”7 
Castellani and Corcoran subsequently sued The Tribune, The Scranton 
Times, and Henn, claiming that the stories were defamatory and that their 
“source” engaged in “tortious, criminal, or contemptuous conduct.”8 The 
papers and Henn thereafter refused Castellani’s and Corcoran’s request for 
them to disclose the unnamed source and invoked Pennsylvania’s Shield Law, 
which states that “[n]o person . . . employed by any newspaper of general 
circulation . . . shall be required to disclose the source of any information 
procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or 
investigation before any government unit.”9 
Trial Judge Robert Mazzoni disagreed, finding that when the Shield Law 
“clashes with the need to enforce and protect the foundation of the grand jury 
purpose”—securing the safety and reputation of witnesses and grand jurors—
“the Shield Law should relinquish its priority.”10 A Superior Court panel 
reversed, concluding that Pennsylvania’s reporter’s privilege was absolute.11 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the appellants claimed, 
inter alia, that the court should carve out a crime-fraud exception to the Shield 
Law similar to the one it read into Pennsylvania’s attorney-client privilege in 
 
5.  956 A.2d at 939-40. 
6.  Id. at 940 (citing Jennifer L. Henn, Dems Stonewall, SCRANTON TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at 1; 
Jennifer L. Henn, Dems Stonewall Grand Jury, TRIB. (Scranton), Jan. 12, 2004, at A1, available 
at http://www.thetimes-tribune.com/articles/2004/01/12/top_local_stories/10790624.txt). 
7.  Id. at 940. 
8.  Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 956 A.2d 937, 941 (Pa. 2008). 
9.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a). For more information, see also PA. NEWSPAPER ASS’N, 
CONFIDENTIALITY SHIELD LAW NEWSPAPER HANDBOOK, http://www.pa-
newspaper.org/web/2005/10/confidentiality_shield_law_newspaper_handbook.aspx. 
10.  956 A.2d at 942 (citation omitted). 
11.  Id. at 942-43 (citing Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 916 A.2d 648, 652-53, 655 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2007)). 
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Nadler v. Warner Co.12  Moreover, they averred that Pennsylvania’s highest 
court had “at one time held every type of privilege—accountant-client, 
husband-wife, priest-penitent, psychologist-patient—inapplicable where it 
would further a crime or fraud.”13 
The court, however, refused to find such an exception, concluding that “the 
Shield Law is not comparable to the attorney-client privilege, or, for that 
matter, to any other privilege with respect to the issue presented here.”14 
According to the court, while “[t]he Shield Law was enacted to protect the free 
flow of information to the news media in their role as information providers to 
the general public,” “[t]he attorney-client privilege . . . renders an attorney 
incompetent to testify as to communications made to him by his client in order 
to promote a free flow of information only between attorney and his or her 
client so that the attorney can better represent the client.”15 
The court further found that Nadler did not speak to the issue before it 
because “the attorney-client privilege is for the benefit of the client, as privilege 
holder, [whereas] the protections recognized in the Shield Law are intended to 
allow the news media to serve the public.”16 The court punctuated this point by 
concluding that “while the news media may be the ‘holder’ of the [Shield 
Law’s] protection, the general public is deemed to be the overall beneficiary of 
the Shield Law’s protections.”17 
no privilege is  an island: the public nature of all 
privileges 
Contrary to the Pennsylvania court’s conclusion, no privilege is an island, 
entire of itself, and, as the Supreme Court announced in Jaffee v. Redmond, all 
privileges must further both private interests and public ends.18 The attorney-
client privilege is no exception. As the Supreme Court articulated in Upjohn Co. 
v. United States, the purpose of the privilege “is to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
 
12.  Id. at 944-45 (construing Nadler v. Warner Co., 184 A. 3, 5 (1936)). In Nadler, the court 
concluded that “[w]hen the advice of counsel is sought in aid of the commission of crime or 
fraud, the communications are not ‘confidential’ within the meaning of the statute, and may 
be elicited from the client or the attorney on the witness stand.” Nadler, 184 A. at 5. 
13.  Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 956 A.2d 937, 945 (Pa. 2008). 
14.  Id. at 951. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996). 
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broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.”19 Indeed, the core premise of the privilege is “that sound legal advice 
or advocacy serves public ends.”20  And, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
has itself forcefully concluded on more than one occasion, “[t]he intended 
beneficiary [of the privilege] is not the individual client so much as the 
systematic administration of justice which depends on frank and open client-
attorney communication.”21 According to that court, then, the attorney-client 
privilege is primarily a public privilege, just like the Shield Law, and not the 
privately focused privilege the court described. 
the shield and (the pen is  mightier than) the sword: how 
crime-fraud exceptions bolster public ends 
While the contrary conclusion in Castellani was troubling, perhaps the part 
of the opinion even less fit to print was the assertion that the crime-fraud 
exception is symbiotic with the allegedly privately focused attorney-client 
privilege and yet parasitic to the publicly focused Shield Law. When explaining 
the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, courts 
often find that the “privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to 
crimes already committed, [but] it cannot be used as a sword or weapon of 
offense to enable persons to carry out contemplated crimes against society.”22  
If the sole beneficiary of the privilege were the client, this distinction would be 
indefensible and there would be no reason to sheath the sword because the 
client would desire nondisclosure in either situation. It is only because of the 
public nature of the privilege that the law cares about prospective harm to third 
parties. Thus, “the basis for the crime-fraud exception is not any diminished 
expectation of confidentiality, but rather the overarching public policy 
principle that a court will not enforce privilege where to do so would facilitate a 
crime.”23 In other words, “[t]he exception demonstrates the policy;” it does not 
undermine it.24 
Despite the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s protestations to the contrary, 
the analysis is “precisely analogous” under the Shield Law25 for reporters. The 
ostensibly lying source in Castellani at best facilitated false reporting of news 
 
19.  449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
20.  Id. 
21.  In re Search Warrant B-21778, 521 A.2d 422, 428 (Pa. 1987). 
22.  State v. Smith, 979 S.W.2d 215, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
23.  Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
24.  In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1987). 
25.  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 405 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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and at worst created news that could have tainted later grand jury testimony as 
well as tarnished the reputations and implicated the legal rights of two men.26 
These outcomes are antithetical to the purposes behind reporters’ privileges in 
that they foster a journalistic house of cards rather than a fortified Fourth 
Estate. Assuming that the source’s behavior was fraudulent or criminal, it did 
not merit protection under Pennsylvania’s Shield Law just as similar behavior 
would not merit protection under any other evidentiary privilege.27 
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26.  Id. 
27.  Eileen A. Scallen, Relational and Informational Privileges and the Case of the Mysterious 
Mediation Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 537, 541 (2004). 
